Two years ago, the Tisza party entered Hungary’s political arena from nowhere - a “market” previously controlled by one dominant player, Fidesz, with a substantial resource advantage and four decades of experience. In just two years, Tisza broke through this structure and defeated the party in a monopoly position. This is difficult to explain through conventional political logic: it is no coincidence that dozens of influential foreign politicians have recently been asking Péter Magyar how he did it and what his secret is. There are many reasons for the victory; here we highlight one of the most important perspectives: the Tisza Party operates like an innovative startup that entered a monopolistic market disruptively and is fundamentally rewriting its rules. As with similar startups, technological and operational innovation played a decisive role in Tisza’s success.
A disruptive startup fundamentally changes how a market operates and displaces established players. Netflix’s streaming eliminated the physical video rental model; Uber directly connected passengers and drivers through an app, and has now driven a substantial share of taxi companies out of business in many US cities. Spotify does not sell music: it made access the dominant model in the music industry and permanently displaced the CD. Revolut acquired 2 million customers in Hungary without bank branches or advertising and became a dominant market player.
Before the digital era, political operations rested on a closed, highly centralised system. Parties communicated with voters through television, radio, street posters and the print press - through journalists - so whoever controlled the media could win elections. Political messages were therefore one-way, and voters were passive recipients. Party organisations were hierarchical, with local branches, slow decision-making, strong internal control and strict HR policies. Operations required substantial infrastructure and resources: money - incredible amounts of money - organisation and headquarters. Over the past 40 years, the fundamental role of the economic interest groups around parties was to generate the funds needed for electoral victory: initially tens of billions, later hundreds of billions of forints.
In 2024, apart from devoted fans, nobody took Péter Magyar seriously through the lens of conventional politics, because his movement began as a one-man show without financial resources or substantial supporters. Two years later, however, it had recruited capable parliamentary candidates, 20,000 election observers and 50,000 unpaid volunteers, and won the election. Above all, success requires the “I have nothing to lose” perspective that is a core value of successful startups and provides fertile ground for innovation and bold experimentation. What innovative solutions contributed to the startup party’s success?
Online fundraising
Since 2010, GoFundMe has raised $40 billion from 1 billion individual donors. Online giving has revolutionised donation habits: people can respond to a personal story, giving strengthens a sense of community and the message can be shared on social media. With social media, an emotionally engaging story can generate organic reach in the millions within days, expanding the core donor community. One-click payments, recurring donations, bank card and Apple Pay integration all support fast, effective, impulsive and emotionally driven giving. The Tisza party generates HUF 250 million per month from small private donations, entirely online or through an app. Police officer Bence Szabó’s crowdfunding campaign raised HUF 200 million in one day. Online fundraising has completely rewritten Hungarians’ previously less active donation habits.
Social media
In traditional media dominated by established parties, institutions stand in for credibility: viewers assess the channel, such as a television station or newspaper, rather than the individual speaker. Successful social media reach, however, depends fundamentally on activity rather than massive spending: content reaches large audiences when it triggers intense reactions quickly, generates conversation and is distributed by the community itself. This behaviour depends largely on whether the message feels real, honest and personal. Over-edited, PR-style content generates less interaction, so algorithms do not distribute it widely. On social media, credibility is therefore not a moral category but a condition for distribution: what feels authentic spreads. In spring 2026, Tisza’s organic, social-media-focused campaign was opposed by heavily funded, forcefully communicated, old-fashioned messages that encouraged less interaction and simply did not work, judging by reach. The governing party’s offline attempts to increase social media activity also repeatedly failed. Offline tools cannot effectively increase online activity, and the messages lacked sufficient integrity, so supporters did not become actively involved in the campaign.
The app
Just as everyone identifies Revolut, Uber and Airbnb with their apps, Tisza’s app is a fundamental tool for sympathisers, volunteers and supporters to contact the party, interact and increase participation. Today, older people also use apps competently. Traditional parties were symbolised by their headquarters; Tisza is symbolised by its app. A good app allows cost-effective, rapid scaling and is secure and convenient.
Networked operations
Airbnb grew from a few thousand accommodation listings to ten million in just a few years: in 2009, the platform had only a thousand listings; now it has 10 million, without building a single hotel. Wikipedia is edited by volunteers around the world under shared guidelines: coordination is digital, and quality assurance is community-based and consensual.
Through its decentralised, networked operations, Tisza fielded 108 parliamentary candidates and fifty thousand volunteers in a short time. Under traditional party logic, it was unimaginable to process 50,000 people through a centrally controlled HR system within a few months, verify their reliability and hold them strictly accountable, as parties had done for decades. Tisza abandoned centralised operations entirely, primarily for lack of time, and created a flat, highly extensive network, accepting practically anyone as a volunteer. Its operations resemble Greenpeace’s volunteer network, for example. The party made volunteering fashionable and communicated its benefits effectively, primarily through its app and social media, quickly gaining fifty thousand unpaid workers. It outsourced quality assurance entirely to coordinators who were also volunteers. Did trust ultimately deliver better results than strong control? The results leave little doubt. Crucially, however, full emotional identification requires integrity in the party’s operations: if supporters retain internal doubts, only force, money or other “hard” incentives remain.
The above clearly shows that innovative, efficient party operations based on new principles are possible only if the political product is designed accordingly: credible, honest and desirable to supporters. Marketing’s oldest rule applies here too: do not try to sell a finished product; shape it to the needs of your consumers and, of course, your distribution channels.
Disruptive businesses dismantled corporate monopolies and created new rules, increasing competition and shaking up - sometimes eliminating - complacent market incumbents. Consumers also benefit from this change: more competition, better products and lower prices. Tisza’s emergence and victory created genuine competition in the previously monopolistic political market, because winning elections with the old toolkit will now be very difficult. Innovative political tools have made it easier to establish parties and movements and expand competition across the political spectrum. Ultimately, this contributes to the fuller development of democracy.
Zsigmond Varga
“Democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Winston Churchill
